

# CS184b: Computer Architecture (Abstractions and Optimizations)

Day 21: May 30, 2003  
Defect and Fault Tolerance



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## Today

- Defect and Fault Tolerance
  - Problem
  - Defect Tolerance
  - Fault Tolerance
- EAS Questionnaire??? (10 min)

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# Probabilities

- Given:
  - N objects
  - P yield probability
- What's the probability for yield of composite system of N items?
  - Assume iid faults
  - $P(N \text{ items good}) = P^N$

# Probabilities

- $P(N \text{ items good}) = P^N$
- $N=10^6, P=0.999999$
- $P(\text{all good}) \approx 0.37$
- $N=10^7, P=0.999999$
- $P(\text{all good}) \approx 0.000045$

## Simple Implications

- As N gets large
  - must either increase reliability
  - ...or start tolerating failures
- N
  - memory bits
  - disk sectors
  - wires
  - transmitted data bits
  - processors

## Increase Reliability?

- $P_{\text{sys}} = P^N$
- Want:  $P_{\text{sys}} = \text{constant}$
- $c = \ln(P_{\text{sys}}) = N \ln(P)$
- $\ln(P) = \ln(P_{\text{sys}})/N$
- $P = N\text{th root of } P_{\text{sys}}$

# Problems

## Two “problems”

- Shorts, breaks
  - wire/node X shorted to power, ground, another node
- Noise
  - node X value flips
    - crosstalk
    - alpha particle
    - bad timing

# Defects

- Shorts example of defect
- Persistent problem
  - reliably manifests
- Occurs before computation
- Can test for at fabrication / boot time and then avoid

# Faults

- Alpha particle bit flips is an example of a fault
- Fault occurs dynamically during execution
- At any point in time, can fail
  - (produce the wrong result)

# First Step to Recover

Admit you have a problem  
(observe that there is a failure)

# Detection

- Determine if something wrong?
  - Some things easy
    - ....won't start
  - Others tricky
    - ...one and gate computes  $F * T \Rightarrow T$
- Observability
  - can see effect of problem
  - some way of telling if defect/fault present

# Detection

- Coding
  - space of legal values < space of all values
  - should only see legal
  - e.g. parity, redundancy, ECC
- Explicit test (defects, recurring faults)
  - ATPG = Automatic Test Pattern Generation
  - Signature/BIST=Built-In Self-Test
  - POST = Power On Self-Test
- Direct/special access
  - test ports, scan paths

# Coping with defects/faults?

- **Key idea:** redundancy
- Detection:
  - Use redundancy to detect error
- Mitigating: use redundant hardware
  - Use spare elements in place of faulty elements (defects)
  - Compute multiple times so can discard faulty result (faults)

# Defect Tolerance

# Two Models

- Disk Drives
- Memory Chips




## Disk Drives

- Expose faults to software
  - software model expects faults
    - Create table of good (bad) sectors
  - manages by masking out in software
    - (at the OS level)
  - yielded capacity varies

## VM/Disk Drive Model

- On startup OS checks physical memory
  - Notes bad pages
  - Treat all bad pages as permanently allocated to the “bad page” process
- Never map user (OS) to a “bad page”
  - User never sees physical addresses
  - Doesn't expect contiguous physical memory

## Page Tables and Defective Memory



## Memory Chips

- Provide model in **hardware** of perfect chip
- Model of perfect memory at capacity X
- Use redundancy in hardware to provide perfect model
- Yielded capacity fixed
  - discard part if not achieve

## Example: Memory

- Correct memory:
  - N slots
  - each slot reliably stores last value written
- Millions, billions, etc. of bits...
  - have to get them all right?

## Memory defect tolerance

- Idea:
  - few bits may fail
  - provide more raw bits
  - configure so yield what looks like a perfect memory of specified size


# Memory Techniques

- Row Redundancy
- Column Redundancy
- Block Redundancy

# Row Redundancy


- Provide extra rows
- Mask faults by avoiding bad rows
- Trick:
  - have address decoder substitute spare rows in for faulty rows
  - use fuses to program

# Spare Row



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# Row Redundancy



[diagram from Keeth&Baker 2001]


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# Column Redundancy


- Provide extra columns
- Program decoder/mux to use subset of columns

# Spare Memory Column

- Provide extra columns
- Program output mux to avoid



# Column Redundancy



[diagram from  
Keeth&Baker 2001]


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# Block Redundancy

- Substitute out entire block
  - e.g. memory subarray
    - include 5 blocks
      - only need 4 to yield perfect
    - (N+1 sparing more typical for larger N)

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# Spare Block



# Yield M of N

- $P(M \text{ of } N) = P(\text{yield } N)$ 
  - +  $(N \text{ choose } N-1) P(\text{exactly } N-1)$
  - +  $(N \text{ choose } N-2) P(\text{exactly } N-2) \dots$
  - +  $(N \text{ choose } N-M) P(\text{exactly } N-M) \dots$[think binomial coefficients]



## M of 5 example

- $1 \cdot P^5 + 5 \cdot P^4(1-P)^1 + 10P^3(1-P)^2 + 10P^2(1-P)^3 + 5P^1(1-P)^4 + 1 \cdot (1-P)^5$
- Consider  $P=0.9$ 
  - $1 \cdot P^5$       0.59       $M=5$   $P(\text{sys})=0.59$
  - $5 \cdot P^4(1-P)^1$     0.33       $M=4$   $P(\text{sys})=0.92$
  - $10P^3(1-P)^2$     0.07       $M=3$   $P(\text{sys})=0.99$
  - $10P^2(1-P)^3$     0.008
  - $5P^1(1-P)^4$     0.00045
  - $1 \cdot (1-P)^5$     0.00001

## Repairable Area


- Not all area in a RAM is repairable
  - memory bits spare-able
  - io, power, ground, control not redundant

# Repairable Area

- $P(\text{yield}) = P(\text{non-repair}) * P(\text{repair})$
- $P(\text{non-repair}) = P^N$ 
  - $N \ll N_{\text{total}}$
  - Maybe  $P > P_{\text{repair}}$ 
    - e.g. use coarser feature size
- $P(\text{repair}) \sim P(\text{yield } M \text{ of } N)$


# Consider HSRA

- Contains
  - wires
  - luts
  - switches



# HSRA


- Spare wires
  - most area in wires and switches
  - most wires interchangeable
- Simple model
  - just fix wires



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## HSRA “domain” model


- Like “memory” model
- spare entire domains by remapping
- still looks like perfect device



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# HSRA direct model


- Like “disk drive” model
- Route design around known faults
  - designs become device specific



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# HSRA: LUT Sparing


- All LUTs are equivalent
- In pure-tree HSRA
  - placement irrelevant
  - *i.e.* which endpoint as long as match logical tree
- skip faulty LUTs



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# Simple LUT Sparing


- Promise  $N-1$  LUTs in subtree of some size
  - e.g. 63 in 64-LUT subtree
  - shift try to avoid faulty LUT
  - tolerate any one fault in each subtree



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# More general LUT sparing


- “Disk Drive” Model
- Promise  $M$  LUTs in  $N$ -LUT subtree
  - do unique placement around faulty LUTs



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# SCORE Array

- Has memory and HSRA LUT arrays




# SCORE Array

- ...but already know how to spare
  - LUTs
  - interconnect
    - in LUT array
    - among LUT arrays and memory blocks
  - memory blocks
- Example how can spare everything in universal computing block

...but


- Important not to expose adjacency
  - *E.g.* physically contiguous real memory
  - *E.g.* Physical adjacency in mesh
- How spare mesh?



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## Transit Multipath


- Butterfly (or Fat-Tree) networks with multiple paths
  - showed last time



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## Multiple Paths


- Provide bandwidth
- Minimize congestion
- Provide **redundancy** to tolerate faults



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## Routers May be faulty (links may be faulty)

- Static
  - always corrupt message
  - not route or misroute message
- Dynamic
  - occasionally corrupt or misroute




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
# Metro: Static Faults

- Turn off
  - faulty ports (make look busy)
  - ports connected to faulty channels
  - ports connected to faulty routers
- As long as paths remain between all communication endpoints
  - still functions

# Multibutterfly Yield




(A) 3-Stage Network Completeness



(B) 4-Stage Network Completeness

# Multibutterfly Performance w/ Faults



# Fault Tolerance

## Metro: dynamic faults

- Detection: Check success
  - checksums on packets to see data intact
  - check destination (arrived at right place)
  - acknowledgement from receiver
    - know someone received correctly
- If fail
  - resend message
    - same as blocked route case

## Metro: dynamic faults

- Consequence
  - may have faulty components
  - as long as
    - detection strong
    - there is a non-faulty path
  - will eventually deliver an intact message
    - may deliver multiple times if fault in ack
    - hence earlier concern about idempotence

## Memory: Dynamic Faults

- Error Correcting Codes (ECC)
- Provide enough redundancy to
  - detect most any errors
  - correct typical errors
- Simple scheme:
  - row and column parity
    - $2 \sqrt{N}$  bits – correct any single bit error
- ...better schemes in practice
  - [Caltech has whole course on this...EE127]

## Processing Faults?

- Simplest model detection:
  - parallel checking
    - run N copies in parallel
    - compare results

## Processor/Gate Fault Handling

- What do on fault?
  - Stop (not do anything wrong)
    - maybe just restart
      - adequate if soft error
    - maybe “reconfigure” to substitute out faulty processor
  - Vote
    - if have enough redundancy take majority
    - Von Neumann shows:
      - Can contain error rate of system to error rate of single component

## Checkpoint and Rollback

- Commit state of computation at key points
  - to memory (ECC, RAID protected...)
  - ...reduce to previously solved problem...
- On faults
  - recover state from last checkpoint
  - like going to last backup....
  - ...(snapshot)

# Together

- Examples of handling faults in
  - processing
  - storage
  - interconnect
- All components of our system

# Big Ideas

- Left to itself:
  - reliability of system  $\ll$  reliability of parts
- Can design
  - system reliability  $\gg$  reliability of parts [defects]
  - system reliability  $\sim$  reliability of parts [faults]
- For large systems
  - must engineer reliability of system

# Big Ideas

- Detect failures
  - static: directed test
  - dynamic: use redundancy to guard
- Repair with Redundancy
- Model
  - establish and provide model of correctness
    - perfect model part (memory model)
    - visible defects in model (disk drive model)